

International Environmental Agreements: Much Ado About Nothing?

**Dissertation der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen
Fakultät der Universität Zürich**

zur Erlangung der Würde eines Doktors
der Wirtschaftswissenschaften

vorgelegt von **Samuel Rutz** von Winterthur ZH

genehmigt auf Antrag von Prof. Dr. Armin Schmutzler

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