Leonard Wessell

An Introduction to Ontological Idealism (A World Hypothesis)


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ISBN:

978-3-8440-9386-5

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Philosophie

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Reference books

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English

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248 pages

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324 g

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21 x 14,8 cm

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Paperback

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39,80 € / 49,80 SFr

Published:

February 2024

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Abstract:

Anyone desiring to understand the world must search his/her experience for a concrete clue from which to engender its comprehension. When in possession of a clue, the reflecting mind then tries to delineate it as the root metaphor which structures the selected area of rational concern. In other words, the mind seeks to understand the area of theoretical analysis by determining the basic analogy found in and suggested by the clue. A series of defining categories will be determined and ordered together enabling a comprehensive insight into the area of theoretical interest. Should theoretical interest seek an understanding of the world as such or as a whole, i.e., as the general structure reality, then the structural categories derived from the clue constitute a "world hypothesis". A world hypothesis becomes thereby the analytical framework in terms of which all lesser areas are understood. When the generality of such a world hypothesis is determined and expressed in philosophical terms, we have a metaphysics. The author of the study argues for an idealistic world hypothesis as a metaphysics of reality.
The author finds the clue for his study in his own "myself", in his own "me", i.e., he looks inward. Based upon the reasons for this choice, the author describes the manner in which he goes about discerning his clue, namely the very activity of his thinking "me" relative to him/herself as the clue to the knowledge desired. The author, following the thought of Austrian philosopher, Robert Reininger, takes note of the world about himself, in which he searches for his clue. It becomes quickly evident that the contents of the clue stem from something that "is". Whatever "is" furnishes the basic analogy for constructing a hypothesis general enough in scope for an interpretation of the world. Traditionally this procedure generates the metaphysics of reality in the terms of "Being/being(s)" (esse/ens). In other words, most thinkers fasten onto the fact that something "is" in order to generalize the clue of this "is" in terms of a theory of Being/being (esse/ens). This is realism, i.e., realism limits itself to the "is" for its understanding. But, Reininger perceptively reminds the author, whatever "is" present as the content of the clue is always so "for me", viz., "for consciousness". Here the author, inspired by Reininger, comes upon a fundamental crux of differentiation between realism and idealism that constitutes an irreconcilable difference in metaphysics of realism and idealism. The vast majority of philosophers begin and end their world hypotheses ignoring, rejecting, or intentionally excluding the "for me", viz., consciousness from being a structural feature, nota, trait of Being/being(s). Just such an exclusion lies at the foundation of metaphysical realism, relative to which the author expends a sizable critique, particularly as a criticism of the realism of Thomism (Thomas Aquinas). Indeed, even for such an outstanding Thomist such as R. Garrigou-Lagrange, consciousness is not a feature of being, but must be revealed as a derivative of ontological analysis, specifically in terms of the nature of God (infinitude).
In contrast to metaphysical realism, and in line with metaphysical idealism, the author emphatically accepts the "for me", viz., consciousness as an essential and constitutive feature of the clue which is to be used to generate an insight into the structural reality of the world as such, viz., in other words, to develop a world hypothesis. Accordingly, the author rejects any metaphysical attempt to separate, to dissolve the relationship between the "is" and the "for me". It is the indissoluble (inter)connection between Beng/being(s) and consciousness that constitute his idealism. All attempts to bifurcate consciousness per se and Being per se into exclusively distinguishable and mutually excluding realms lead to nihilism, i. e., to reflecting consciously upon that which is supposedly beyond all consciousness, upon that which does not pertain in any way to or is open to consciousness. The world's reality thereby becomes what things are independent or consciousness per se. But, as the American idealist Josiah Royce, more than a century ago, noted, the "independence" of realism as a metaphysical concept can be given no content, viz., possesses no meaning. On a finite level of the human mind functioning in and with the world, realism has its place (cf. C. I. Lewis). The human (finite) mind is continually occupied with that which is beyond its finite awareness, often enough something quite new, some-thing unknown. But such a consideration is one on the level of finitude, i.e., within the framework of the human mind and not of Being in itself and consciousness in itself. The "for me", namely consciousness, must be considered as part of the clue used to generate the world hypothesis. This is, of course, idealism.
Consider: If the reality of the world per se is held to be what is "beyond" all the things (including all properties open to rational insight) present to consciousness per se, then absolutely nothing, no-thing-ness, nothinginess can be said of, can be ascribed to such supposed reality of "beyondness". The thesis is: If the "for me" is viewed as soluble from the "is"; then absolutely nothing viz., no-thing can be meaningfully ascribed to the reality of the "beyond". This absolute nothingness is shown to be a pseudo-concept, apparently meaning something, yet absent all content, thereby constituting a theoretical fallacy. To claim that the thingness of all things, the Being of beings, entails a beyondness excluding all references to whatsoever pertains to consciousness is to assert nothing at all, i.e., is to assert a pseudo-concept. Being and consciousness are co-extensive. And such extensiveness constitutes the foundation of metaphysical idealism. The study progresses from the establishment of idealism to a limited consideration of its implications for infinity and "I-ness". Such is the progressive content that forms Chapters 1, 2, and 3, whereas Chapter 4, a forethought, offers a variant approach to the clue, it makes use of German terminology. The hope being that an understanding of the German of Robert Reininger will deepen the comprehension of idealism.